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Abstract: This paper addresses one of the core questions in developing entrepreneurship theory, 
i.e. why and when do some choose to become entrepreneurs. Differing from other research 
efforts on it, we look at entrepreneurial decision making as population behavior and the 
individuals’ strategy of human capital investment to realize latent ability constrained by certain 
environmental context. Assuming that individuals with/without latent innovative or/and 
entrepreneurial ability might make corresponding human capital investment and become 
different kind of employees or entrepreneurs, we bring forward an evolutionary stable model of 
the individuals ’ entrepreneurial human capital investment from the society lay. We further 
develop an evolutionarily game model of the individuals’ human capital investment decision-
making from the point of those who would be an entrepreneur  applying replicator dynamics 
equation. The analysis and calculation result of the models show that entrepreneurship is 
contingent upon environmental context, there will be different entrepreneurial distribution when 
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1. Introduction  
 
Why and when do some choose to become entrepreneurs is one of the core questions in developing 
entrepreneurship theory (Shane 2002, Amit 1993, 1995). For answering this kind of questions, Robert A. 
Baron (2004) proposed a cognitive perspective recently. Mariassunta Giannetti and Andrei Simonov 
(2003) modeled the determinants of entrepreneurial choices so as to investigate whether social norms 
play an important role in the decision to become an entrepreneur. Minniti (2003) investigated the relative 
role played by alertness and asymmetric information on entrepreneurial decisions at the same time and 
presented a spin-glass model in which an individual decides whether to become an entrepreneur based on 
her alertness and on the information available in her environment. Another model of the choice to 
become an entrepreneur is also presented by Lacear (2003), through which the author got the primary 
conclusion that individuals with balanced skills are more likely than others to become entrepreneurs. 
Earlier, Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shliefer and Visny (1991) argued, institutions that affect 
occupations’ relative payoffs or access to credit influence occupational choices. In fact, social scientists 
have long recognized the importance of social factors in occupational choice. For example, Balazs (1964)  
explained that perhaps the supreme inhibiting factor resulting in the low level of entrepreneurship in old 
China was the overwhelming prestige of the state bureaucracy, which is indeed a profound insight even 
today. Other scholars (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989) contribute to the topic of 
entrepreneurial choices by analyzing the characteristics of individuals who are likely to become self-
employed. Additionally, Lucas (1978) ever offered a model of where an individual can choose to work 
for someone or to be an entrepreneur. 
Although we understand entrepreneurial decision more and more via the interesting scholastic pursuits as 
above, there still is a long way to go for this. In our opinion, it’s a pity that almost no literature regards 
entrepreneurial choice as a kind of population behavior and evolutionary game phenomenon. The 
decision-making of individuals’ choices to become entrepreneurs is not only based on individuals 
themselves but is also based on the context of entrepreneurs as a social lay. On the other hand, it’s more 
like the process of “trial and error” than individuals’ optimal option when they decide to startup or not. 
This article  contributes to our understanding of entrepreneurship by analyzing the games of individuals’ 
human capital investment as well as entrepreneurial decision making and correspondingly setting up an 
evolutionary framework. Primarily, we develop an evolutionarily stable model of the individual’s human 
capital investment from society lay; we further study an evolutionarily game model of the individual’s 
human capital investment decision-making from the point of those who would to be an entrepreneur; 
then, we get results and analyze them by putting concrete value in the models. We mainly find or prove 
that, entrepreneurship is contingent upon environmental context, there will be different 
entrepreneurial distribution when individuals are aware of their latent ability or not, and 
governments or societies can always improve the level of entrepreneurship via paying more 
attention to education and changing the environmental context. 
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We study the decision-making equilibrium of the individual willing to be an entrepreneur applying 
evolutionary game theory, which has been widely used to explain the evolutionary process and result of 
population behavior in Ecology, Sociology, and Economics (Friedman, 1998). The use of game theory to 
model (some) aspects of entrepreneurship behavior was introduced by Littlechild (1979) who argued that 
cooperative game theory could be used to model the entrepreneurial process. Game theory makes it 
possible to model a limited version of novelty, for example by letting entrepreneur introduce actions that 
are novel to the other agents being modeled (Littlechild 1979, Fisher 1983). Young (1996) suggested that 
repeating coordination games, in which there may be multiple equilibria, is a way to make sense of 
entrepreneur since it can be thought of as selecting a specific equilibrium.  Introducing multiple 
equilibr ium mean that there may be a room for the entrepreneur who is broadly understood as the agent 
who helps pushing the system from one equilibrium to another.  Schumpeter addressed this aspect of 




2. The models 
 
Assume there are two types of industries in society, i.e. new, emerging firms (N) and established, 
traditional firms (T), and two types of occupations , i.e. entrepreneurs (E) and employees (L). Individuals 
choose certain occupation/jobs (J) in certain industry. Therefore there are four types of occupations to be 
chosen in a society: innovative entrepreneur, imitative entrepreneur, innovative/expert employee and 
common employee, indicated as a job choosing collective J={ }TLNLTENE ,,, . Because if individuals 
want to take up certain occupation in certain industry, they must make an individual human capital 
investment, such as learning specialized knowledge, acquiring professional train ing and accumulating 
experience via “learning by doing”, and they should pay for cost which we subdivide into industry-
entering investment cost and job-choosing investment cost. We standardize human capital investment 
cost of entering traditional firms C TI  and those of choosing common employees C LI  as 0, indicate 
innovative human capital investment cost of entering emerging firms as CNI ( d ) ( C NI ( d ) >0), 
and common entrepreneuria l human capital investment cost of choosing entrepreneurs as C EI ( ? )
(C EI ( ? ) >0). CNI ( d ) and C EI ( ? ) depend on individual latent innovative ability (d ) and 
latent entrepreneurial (carving out) ability (? ), and are their decreasing function respectively. Herein, (
d , ? ) is the distinct parameter of individual latent ability, and we assume that d and ?  follow even 
(two-point) distribution in [0, 1]. Therefore, each individual has four human capital investment strategies, 
indicated as investment strategy collective as I={ I j | j=NE, TE, NL, TL} . We consider that human 
capital investments are inter-independent and investment costs are addable, i.e. C NE ( d , ? ) = C NI (
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d ) + C EI ( ? ) , CTE ( d , ? ) = C EI ( ? ) , C NL ( d , ? ) = C NI ( d ) , CTL ( d , ? ) =0, 
This means that the investment cost of individuals with the same latent ability choosing to become 
entrepreneurs in emerging firms is the highest, whereas that of becoming common employees in 
traditional firms is the lowest. 
 
2.1 Evolutionary stable model of the individuals’ human capital investment from society lay 
Let’s consider a two-stage game model above all. In the first stage of the game, individuals with latent 
ability (d , ? ) invest certain type of human capital I j  (j∈J) in some way. In the second stage, they take 
certain occupation of certain firms according to their human capital reserve and social demands and 
supplies. If every type of individuals wants to choose certain occupation j, they must acquire 
corresponding human capital I j or human capital at more advanced level. There are two types of this 
acquisition: the first is to acquire human capital before occupation choosing, but they may not obtain 
their expected occupation. The other is to supplement corresponding human capital after obtaining the 
occupations, that is, when they obtain the occupation which need more human capital than that they own, 
they supplement their deficient human capital investment.  
If individuals with certain latent ability want to realize their potential values, they must obtain an 
occupation corresponding to their latent ability. We assume that they should make corresponding human 
capital investment to obtain certain type of occupation and pay for working costs on the post. Therefore, 
cost C j ( I, d , ? )  for individuals with latent ability ( d , ? )  engaged in an occupation j∈ J 
consists of three parts: (1) working cost C( j, d , ? ) ( j∈J) for this occupation. It relates to latent 
ability and we assume that it is independent and addable to d  and ? , i.e. C( NE, d , ? ) =C( N, d
) +C( E, ? ) , and so on. (2) Investment cost C j ( d , ? ) of human capital I j ( j∈ J)
corresponding to the occupation. (3) Transferring cost C (d , ? , I j ) for the difference from qualified 
human capital I j ( j∈J) in this occupation. Therefore the cost C h( I j , d , ? ) of individuals with 
latent ability ( d , ? ) engaged in an occupation h ∈J after acquiring human capital I j ( j∈ J) is 
indicated as details in table1. 
Now we standardize total population as 1, q j indicates the population engaged in a job j( j∈J) and we 
have q NE +q NL +q TE +q TL =1. Entrepreneurs compose enterprises randomly through employing 
employees, the latter get competitive fixed salary W NL  or WTL ( W NL > W TL ) , and the former get 
entrepreneurial profit income. Then we bring in two hypotheses: (1) the proportion of expenses that the 
whole society pays for the products of the two types of industries is fixed. Assume the proportion of 
expenses for N industry isα , and that of T industry is β ,α + β =1; (2) Take the income of the whole 
employees in this type of industry out of the total income, then divide it evenly among the whole 
entrepreneurs and thus we get the entrepreneurial income. Furthermore, we standardize the wages WTL  
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of employees in traditional firms as 1 and the expected social output as y, thus, the expected incomes of 













Therefore, when individual with latent ability ( d , ? ) choose to invest human capital I j ( j∈J) and 
obtain relevant position j, in the state of qNE , q NL , qTE , q TL , the expected net income is:  
uTL =w TL                                                                                                                  (2.1) 












- CEI( ? ) - CNI (d )- C( E, ? ) -C(N, d )         (2.4) 
For individuals with latent ability( d , ? ) , if there is discrepancy in the payoffs of choosing strategies, 
strategies should be adjusted. In short-term situations, human capital owners will re-choose occupations 
to adjust the discrepancy in the payoffs of various strategies. But the long-term evolutionary stable 
consequence is that the payoffs of strategies for individuals with the same abilities to make human 
capital investment are the same. Because of the influence of occupational inertia, psychological pressure 
and transferring cost, there are only part of individuals re-choosing their occupations even there is a large 
discrepancy in the payoffs. Thus, the probability of individual adjustment is in direct proportion to the 
discrepancy of the payoffs of two strategies. 
To be succinct, we bring in the following hypothesis here: (1) the cost for individual without some latent 
ability to acquire relevant human capital is high. Even if he acquires relevant human capital, because the 
cost to undertake the occupation is rather high, it is profitless to make relevant human capital investment 
on individual without some latent ability. (2) Individuals with some kind of human capital must obtain 
corresponding occupations. In fact, this hypothesis acknowledges that high level human capital is 
deficient and high human capital owners will not take low-level occupations. These two hypotheses 
mean that individual decisions of occupation choosing attribute to whether to make human capital 
investment. 
When reaching dynamics equilibrium after long-term adjustment, every type of population has its 
optimal human capital investment strategy and relevant occupation choice, i.e. (1) for individuals with 
different latent abilities, they should have their optimal human capital investment strategies and therefore 
their optimal occupation choice in equilibrium. (2) For individuals with same latent abilities, they can get 
relevant occupations when making some kind of human capital investment. If they choose to invest in 
high-level human capital, the payoffs will not be less than that before human capital investment. (3) For 
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/4-14
Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Choice to Become Entrepreneur 
 
 9
individuals with same latent abilities, there is no discrepancy in the payoffs of different human capital 
investment strategies; otherwise, individuals will only choose those with higher payoffs. 
Because the distribution of latent ability (d , ? ) in the whole population is random and the distribution 
of innovative ability and entrepreneurial ability is independent, with d  and ?  follows two-point 
distribution (0 and 1 represent without latent ability and with latent ability respectively) hypothesis, the 
whole population is divided into four types: (1) latent innovative entrepreneurs: d =1, ? =1; (2) latent 
expert employees: d =1, ? =0; (3) latent imitative entrepreneurs: d =0, ? =1; (4) latent common 
employees: d =0, ? =0. 
In an original state( q NE , q NL , qTE , qTL ) when deciding whether to make some human capital 
investment (make latent ability change into real ability), if there is discrepancy in the payoffs between 
two strategies, individuals with latent ability d  or/and ?  will adjust strategies. At last the payoffs of 
strategies, which individuals with same latent abilities choose, are the same. However, due to the 
discrepancy in natural endowment, individuals without any latent ability have to receive common 
employee income, though the ability rent is high. 
The point of the above-modeled dynamics stable  equilibrium is the state of the unchanged proportion of 






TL ) , for 
all j∈J, t as time and when the formula is set up as follows: 
 o
dt
dq j =   
We summarize the calculated dynamics stable fixed equilibrium points in table 2. Within the types of 
equilibrium in it, equilibriums 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the types of equilibrium that individuals can obtain 
innovative entrepreneurial ability rent; equilibriums 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9 are the types of equilibrium that 
individuals can obtain common entrepreneurial ability rent while in equilibrium 10, nobody can obtain 
any ability rent.  
In equilibrium 1, individuals with some latent ability make relevant human capital investment, undertake 
relevant occupations and obtain corresponding ability rent. This is a kind of Pareto optimal equilibrium, 
i.e. individuals with higher ability obtain more ability rent making the best possible use of human and 
material resources and bringing the motivation of individuals with different latent abilities into full play. 
This is a period that innovative ability and entrepreneurial ability can be brought into full play.  
In equilibrium 2, it makes no difference for individuals with only latent innovative ability whether to 
make relevant human capital investment. Individuals with only latent innovative ability cannot obtain 
corresponding ability rent, and this is equilibrium that is unhelpful for innovative talents and therefore 
constrains their motivation. However, individuals with latent entrepreneurial ability can still obtain their 
ability rent.  
In equilibrium 3, it makes no difference for individuals with only latent entrepreneurial ability whether to 
make relevant human capital investment. Individuals with only latent entrepreneurial ability cannot 
obtain corresponding ability rent, and this is equilibrium that is unhelpful for entrepreneurial talents and 
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therefore constrains their motivation. However, individuals with latent innovative ability can still obtain 
their ability rent.  
In equilibrium 4, it makes no difference for individuals with only latent entrepreneurial ability or only 
latent innovative ability whether to make relevant human capital investment. Neither individuals with 
only latent entrepreneurial nor those with only latent innovative ability can obtain corresponding ability 
rents, and this is equilibrium that is unhelpful for these two types of talents and therefore constrains their 
motivation. However, individuals with both latent innovative ability and latent entrepreneurial ability can 
obtain innovative entrepreneurial ability rent. 
 
2.2 Evolutionary stable strategies of the individuals’ human capital investme nt game  
In the process of the above equilibrium analyses, we do not take it into consideration whether the 
individual with latent ability himself or his family can afford the human capital investment, and put it 
under the hypothesis that he who invests human capital is certain to get the corresponding post, which 
may not be satisfied in reality. We ignore the first case because the individual with latent ability whose 
family cannot afford the human capital investment can accumulate his human capital slowly through the 
experience called “learning by doing”. For the second case, we can transform it into the following 
probability matrix (in table 3). Also, we can bring in the probability matrix that shows kinds of 
individuals with latent ability investing different human capitals. Then after the previous work, we can 
analyze the evolutionarily stable strategies of an individual with the latent ability( d , ? )  in choosing 
kinds of human capital investments by introducing the analysis of expected reward.  
We record the probability of an individual with human capital I j ( j∈J) taking up a job h∈J as p(
I j , h) ( h, j∈J) , which is unconcerned with individuals’ latent ability. We know from the context 
that the cost Ch( I j , d , ? ) of an individual with human capital I j ( j∈J) , and latent ability ( d , 
? )  taking up a job h∈J is made up of three parts: (1) working cost of undertaking the job C( h) (
h∈J) , which is assumed has nothing to do with individuals’ latent ability; (2) obtained human capital 
investment cost C( I j , d , ? ) ;  (3) And the supplementary human capital investment cost when 
obtaining a job that demands more human capital than one has had. The specific forms are as follows:           









other           ),,(),,()(
jh                                 ),,()(












         
In the first case, jf h indicate the surplus human capital that one has more than the occupation demands, 
and it is an idle waste of human capital investment to the certain individual. Such case happens as 
individuals with innovative entrepreneurial human capital can take up only innovative employees’ work 
or common employees’ work. The second case is just contrary to the first one i.e. lack of human capital 
investment. Here hfj means that the obtained occupation demands so much that the available human 
capital is not qualified to it, but the existing human capital is also required, so they just add the lacking 
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investment. Such cases happen as individuals with only common entrepreneurial human capital taking up 
innovative entrepreneurial jobs. In the third case, the obtained human capital has nothing to do with 
one’s job, so he could do nothing but set the available human capital idle and add new human capital 
investment suitable for his job.  
During the time t, the reward function when an individual becomes an innovative or imitative 
entrepreneur is determined by profit function ƒ NE ( d , ? ,K, r t ,s t ) or ƒTE ( ? , K, r t
' ,s t ) , 
minus entrepreneurs’ human capital investment cost and working cost of choosing entrepreneurs, in 
which the profit function is determined by individuals’ latent ability( d , ? ) or ? , the capital K that 
he can employ ( reflecting management scale ), the ratio of this kind of entrepreneurial human capital 
owners in the whole population r t = r t (NE)or r t
' = r t ( TE) ( reflecting degrees of competition ), 
and microeconomic situation s t . We suppose that s t  follows the same independent two-point 
distribution array and P { s t =1 } =h 0 , P { s t =0 } =1-h 0 , in which s t =1 indicates the good 
microeconomic situation while s t =0 indicates the bad one. Specific forms are as follows (b≥a>1>c>0): 
ƒ NE ( ? ,d  , K, r t ,s t ) =a t
s b δ+Φ K c ( 1-r t )  
ƒTE ( ? , K, r t
' ,s t ) =a
ts bΦ  K c ( 1-r t
' )  
Individuals obtain competitive salary reward when becoming some kind of employees, besides which, 
innovative employees share another part of profit concerning economic situation and the ir latent ability. 
Competitive salary reward means that the salary of some kind of employees depends on the ratio of 
employee reserve of the industry in the whole population i.e. x t ( N) ( or x t ( L) ) , and is a strictly  
decreasing function of x t ( N) ( or x t ( L) , i.e. x t
' ) . As for the salary we adopt the following 
linear supposition:  
ƒ NL ( t) =w NL ( t) =w 0 -α x t ( N) +β g( s t ,d )  
ƒTL ( t) =wTL ( t) = w 0
' -α x t ( L)  
In them, α >0, β = 0, β  is the dependent coefficient of the function of innovative employees’ salary 
to the economic situation and individuals’ latent ability. Therefore, the reward Rh( I j , d , ? ) of 
individuals with latent ability( d , ? ) and obtained human capital I j ( j∈J) taking up occupations 
h∈J can be shown by the following math’s formula:  










other          ),,(),,()(),,(
jh                                ),,()(),,(
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We use E s ƒ j ( s t , d , ? ) to indicate the expected reward function of individuals with latent ability
( d , ? ) toward the economic situation s t  when taking up a job j during the time t. Then the expected 
reward E s R i ( I j , d , ? )  to individuals with latent ability ( d , ? )  and obtained human capital 
I j ( j∈J) taking up occupations h∈J is: 










other      ),,(),,()(),,(
jh                            ),,()(),,(












      
The specific forms of expected reward in any cases can be classified into Table 4. 
Then we can get the expected reward E j [E s Rh( I j , d , ? ) ] of individuals with latent ability( d , 
? ) and obtained human capital I j ( j∈J) during the time t: 





During the time t, individuals with latent ability (d , ? ) have four types of human capital investment 
strategies and we mark the probability of the investment I j ( j∈J) as p t ( I j , d , ? ) .Then during 
the time t, the expected reward EI{ Eh [E s Rh( I j ,d , ? ) ]}  when individuals with latent ability(
d , ? ) invest human capital I j  under the probability p t ( I j ,d , ? ) is: 






δ  p t ( I j , d , ? )  
Therefore, we can get the corresponding replicator dynamics equation: 











δ p t ( I j ,d , ? ) }  
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δδδδ PIpNLIpPIp NEtNENLt  






δδδδ PIpTLIpPIp TEtTETLt + 






δδδδ PIpTLIpPIp NLtNLNEt  
Therefore, we can get the corresponding p* ( I j , d , ? ) ( j∈J) . This is the evolutionarily stable 
strategy of kinds of latent individuals making types of human capital investments.  
The above separating equilibrium is expressed under the hypothesis that each individual knows clearly 
about his own latent ability and the distribution of individuals’ latent ability in society. Each individual 
type may choose any type of strategy suitable for him so individuals with different latent abilities have 
different equilibrium strategies. Nevertheless, when individuals are not aware of their own latent ability, 
the evolutionarily stable strategies of individuals’ capital investment will be the same to them all, which 
means that the choice has nothing to do with the latent ability( d , ? ) . This is a kind of pooling 
equilibrium. At this time, each individual will consider the average  expected income of the whole society 
investing some kind of human capital as criterion whether the individual himself will invest human 
capital. When each individual invests human capital I j  under the probability p t ( I j ) the average 
expected income of the whole society is: 









jtjjhs PIphIPIRE  
The corresponding raplicator dynamics equation is:  

















jtjjhs PIphIPIRE  
Therefore, we can get the corresponding stable state point p * ( I j ) . The whole society reaches a stable 
state through investing the human capital I j under the probability p
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3. Results of the analysis of the models & calculations  
 
3.1 Calculation of the evolutionary stable equilibrium model 
Assume the distribution probability of latent ability of individuals as P{ d =1} =P{ ? =1} =0.2, when 
W TL =1 , W NL =2 , the production of emerging and traditional industry is α y=1.2, β y=0.48 
respectively. The cost quadratic  function of equation (2.2) and (2.3) is: 
CNI (d )+C(N, d )=a-d 2  
CEI (? )+C(E, ? )=b-? 2  
Here a and b represent the fixed cost of innovative work and imitative entrepreneurial work respectively, 
irrelevant to individual latent ability. It reflects the social system adapting cost of individuals engaged in 
innovative production and entrepreneurial work. The more the value, the more the social friction cost or 
the higher the working requirements. We can see that when a and b are given different values, there will 
be different kinds of equilibrium and it is their value that influences the choosing of strategies. We have 
to point out that this cost function is different from the requirements in equilibrium analysis chart. Here, 
for individuals without any latent ability, the cost for them to acquire relevant human capital and take up 
corresponding job is not too high. So it attracts individuals with low ability to take up this job when its 
rent is too high.  
Under this hypothesis, the expected net income for individuals with latent ability ( d , ? ) to choose to 
invest human capital I j (j∈J) is: 
uTL =1 















NL δ  
First, let’s discuss equilibrium 1. We notice that the feature of this equilibrium is that individuals with 
some latent ability can fully make relevant human capital investment and undertake the occupation that 
can develop their latent ability. Thus, when P{ d =1} =P{ ? =1} =0.2, we can get q NE =0.04, 
q NL =0.16, q TE =0.16, q TL =0.64. Therefore, the expected net incomes for individuals with latent 
ability( d, ? ) to adopt each human capital investment strategy is: 
uTL =1                     uNL =2- a+d
2  
uTE =3.5- b+?
2    uNE =4- a+d
2 - b +? 2  
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For individuals who satisfyd =1, ? =1, because it is optimal to make innovative entrepreneurial human 






TL . Therefore, we 
can get: 
a<1.5, b<3, a+b<5 
For individuals who satisfyd =1, ? =0, because it is optimal to make innovative human capital 






TL . Therefore, we can get: 
a<2, 2< b, 0.5< b- a 
For individuals who satisfyd =0, ? =1, because it is optimal to make imitative entrepreneurial human 






TL . Therefore, we 
can get: 
0.5< a, b<3.5, b- a<2.5 
For individuals who satisfy d =0, ? =0, because it is optimal to make common employee human 






NE . Therefore, we 
can get: 
1< a, 2.5< b, 3 < a +b 
Thus, we can get the satisfactory condition for equilibrium 1: 
1< a<1.5, 2.5< b<3, 3 < a+ b <5, 0.5< b- a<2.5 
This means that when  a and b satisfy the above conditions, we can reach the optimal equilibrium, all of 
the individuals with some latent ability can change it into real ability and obtain relevant occupations. 
We will discuss when a and b are beyond the boundary, how the equilibrium will evolve. 
When a=1.5 and b=3, at the upper boundary, if individualsd =1, ? =1 make both innovative ability and 
entrepreneurial ability investment or either, the net income is the same, but they should invest both 
human capital. This is because if some of them only invest one kind of these two human capitals, they 
will be far from this strategy. In fact, if some individualsd =1, ? =1 only invest entrepreneurial human 
capital, there will be uTE  reduction and uNE  increase and as a result they have to invest both human 
capital. In the same way, if some individualsd =1, ? =1 only invest innovative human capital, with u NL  
being the same, q NL  increases and q NE  reduces. As a result, u NE  increases and this also leads them to 
invest both human capitals. Therefore, any individual with latent ability will invest relevant latent ability 
human capital at this time. This still belongs to equilibrium 1, but this is special, although individuals 
with latent abilityd =1, ? =1 have three kinds of strategies without discrepancy, only one is practicable.  
When either variable a or b is at or within the upper boundary, the other goes on and beyond the critical 
value, there will be discrepancy in the scores of different investment strategies and the strategies will be 
adjusted. For example, when b= 3 is set up, if 1.5<a<2, we might as well make a=1.8, uTE =4.5- b> 
u NE =4.2- b for individualsd =1, ? =1. It is more worthwhile for this kind of individuals to only invest 
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imitative entrepreneurial human capital rather innovative entrepreneurial human capital. Some individual 
with latent ability d =1, ? =1 will adjust strategies, only to invest imitative entrepreneurial human 
capital. This will influence qNL  and q NE , lead to uTE  reduction and u NE  increase and finally reach new 
equilibrium again. Suppose individuals who change to only invest imitative entrepreneurial human 















Thus, the solution x=0.0025, and the adjusted probability is 6.25%, that is, only 6.25% of individuals 
with latent abilityd =1, ? =1 only invest imitative entrepreneurial human capital. This is equilibrium 5 
that we have analyzed before. 
Furthermore, when a=2, it makes no difference for individuals with only innovative latent ability whether 
to invest relevant human capital or not. If a goes upward a>2 (b unchanged), this kind of individuals will 
not make any human capital investment because the society cannot go without innovative talents, a=2 is 
the utmost upper boundary. At this time, individuals with only latent innovative ability can only get the 
same net reward as those without any latent ability; individuals with both innovative latent ability and 
entrepreneurial ability can only get the same net income as those with only imitative entrepreneurial 
latent ability. This is equilibrium 6 that we have analyzed before. 
Similarly, if a satisfies 1<a<1.5 or a=1.5 and b goes beyond as 3<b<3.5, for individuals with latent 
ability d =1, ? =1, a certain proportion of individuals will only make innovative human capital 
investment. This is equilibrium 7 that we have analyzed. If b changes further as b= 3.5 (a unchanged), 
this corresponds equilibrium 8, individuals with only common entrepreneurial latent ability cannot obtain 
any rent reward and meantime those with both types of latent ability can only obtain creative ability rent 
reward.  
There is an exceptional situation, when either a or b is at upper boundary and the other is within, and we 
might as well suppose that a satisfies 1<a<1.5, b=3. For individuals with innovative entrepreneurial 
latent ability, their ability rent is the same as that of individuals with only innovative latent ability, but 
the latter will invest innovative entrepreneurial human capital. This is because if some individualsd =1,
? =1 only invest innovative human capital, with u NL  being the same, qNL  increases and q NE  reduces. 
As a result, uNE  increases and they will make innovative entrepreneurial human capital investment 
again. This still be longs to equilibrium 1. When a=1.5 and 2.5<b<3, the discussion can go on in the same 
way. 
When variables both a and b go beyond the critical value, there are several following situations: 
(1) If 1.5<a= 2, 3<b<3.5 and a+b= 5, individuals with latent abilityd =1, ? =1 can obtain part 
of ability rent reward when they invest any one kind of latent ability or two at the same time. Because of 
the available selections, they will adopt the investment strategy with high human capital investment rent 
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reward. Therefore, when uNE >u NL  and uTE , this corresponds to equilibrium 1; when u NL >u NE  and uTE , 
this corresponds to equilibrium 7; when u TE >u NL  and u NE , this corresponds to equilibrium 5. 
(2) If 1.5<a= 2, 3<b<3.5 and a+b>5, this is equilibrium 9. Individuals with both innovative 
latent ability and common entrepreneurial latent ability can obtain part of ability rent. They have three 
kinds of strategies to choose. When reaching equilibrium, they can obtain the same rent reward as those 
with either innovative latent ability or entrepreneurial ability. 
(3) If a= 2 and b= 3.5, this is equilibrium 10, this is the worst equilibrium. No individual can 
obtain extra ability rent reward. This is a tragedy for the whole society. So, we should guarantee that 
individuals with ability have motivation to develop their latent ability through system, which requires 
reducing social cost for individuals to undertake complicated work. 
We have discussed upper boundary conditions above. Similarly, we can discuss lower boundary. 
All the above equilibrium analyses are concluded under the hypothesis that an individual’s latent ability 
( d , ? ) respectively follows the distribution of the two independent points. We can easily popularize 
it to the case that individual’s latent ability( d , ? ) respectively obeys the even distribution on[ 0, 1]
independently. In equilibrium the line of demarcation of the latent ability ( d * , ? * ) will separate the 
whole population into four types: (1) latent innovative entrepreneurs { ( d , ? ) | d = d * ,
? = ? * } ;(2) Latent imitative entrepreneurs { ( d , ? ) | d <? * , ? = ? * } ; (3) Latent 
innovative employees{ ( d , ? ) | d = d * , ? <? * } ; (4). latent common employees{ ( d , ?
) | d <d * , ? <? * } .  
Because the cost of acquiring human capital is in inverse proportion to one’s ability, it is different from 
the two-point distribution hypothesis that in spite of the existing high working cost such as system, 
environment and so on. Individuals with the two high abilities( i.e. ( d , ? ) >( d * , ? * ) ) obtain 
their ability rent as innovative entrepreneurs in equilibrium. As one declines below the critical ability, the 
individual can still obtain the rent for the other ability, that is, above the critical one; as both decline 
below the critical, he only becomes a common employee. As for individuals with the critical ability (i.e. 
meeting the conditions { ( d , ? ) | making( d , ? ) =( d * , ? * ) , or d =d * , ?  <? * , or 
d <d * , ? =? * } , it makes no difference whether they invest human capital or not, so they cannot 
obtain the corresponding ability rent.  
We can get( d * , ? * ) specifically. Choose the following quadratic functions of cost in formulae( 2.2
) and (2.3): 
CNI (d )+ C(N, d )=a- d 2  
CEI( ? ) + C( E, ? ) =b- ? 2  
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In equilibrium( d * , ? * ) , it makes no difference to carry on types of strategies of human capital 
investment, that is, the expected reward is the same for individuals with latent ability ( d * , ? * ) in 
choosing the four types of human capital investment strategies, so we have:  
uTL ( d
* , ? * ) =u TE ( d
* , ? * ) =u NL ( d
* , ? * ) =u NE ( d
* , ? * )  
Under the hypothesis of the even distribution of d , ? , we can get in equilibrium: 
q NE =( 1- d
* ) ( 1- ? * )        q NL =( 1- d
* ) ? *  
qTE =d
* ( 1- ? * )                      qTL =d
* ? *  
Therefore, we can get the specific  ( d * , ?
*
)  and y in equilibrium. We make wTL =1, w NL =2,
a=1.64, b=2, α =0.3, β =0.7, and then can get: 
uTL =1 























From the equilibrium conditions we get in equilibrium: 
d * =0.8, y=1.6 
And get the satisfactory conditions about ? * : 
? 3 - ? 2 - 2? +1.6=0 
Therefore, we can get the satisfactory conditions ? * =0.73. 
We notice that y is the expected income of society. In equilibrium, the expected income for the 
individuals with latent ability ( d * , ? * )  in choosing to become imitative entrepreneurs in traditional 
industries or innovative entrepreneurs in emerging industries are respectively: 
ER TE =2.48, ER NE =3.48 
However, if deducting the corresponding human capital investment cost and occupations’ working cost, 
it makes no difference for the individuals to choose any type of the four human capital investment 
strategies at the critical pointd * =0.8, ?
*
=0.73, and the net reward is always 1.  
We reach the following conclusions about the distribution of individuals’ latent ability. 
( 1) Individuals’ latent ability can satisfy { ( d , ? ) | d >d * , ? >? * } . At this time, 
individuals will become innovative entrepreneurs in emerging industries through investing the two types 
of latent ability i.e. through innovative entrepreneurial human capital investment. Consequently, they can 
obtain innovative entrepreneurial ability rent and the higher one’s ability is, the more rent he will obtain. 
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( 2) Individuals’ latent ability can satisfy{ ( d , ? ) | d <d *,? >? * } . At this time, 
individuals will become entrepreneurs in traditional industries through investing only common 
entrepreneurial human capital, and obtain imitative entrepreneurial ability rent reward.  
( 3) Individuals’ latent ability can satisfy { ( d , ? ) | d >d *,? <? * } . At this time, 
individuals will become employees in newly emerging industries through investing only innovative 
ability, and obtain innovative ability rent reward. 
( 4) Individuals’ latent ability can satisfy{ ( d , ? ) | d <d *,? <? * } . At this time, 
individuals will become common employees in traditional industries without any human capital 
investment, because the strategy is optimal for them. 
When some type of individuals’ latent ability is at the critical point i.e. d =d * or ? =? * , it makes no 
difference whether we carry on the human capital investment of this ability. 
3.2 Analysis and calculation of the replicator dynamics equation 
We make such hypothesis: as in Table 5, the probability p( I j , h) of an individual with human 
capital I j ( j∈J) taking up an occupation h∈J is a symmetrical supposition and independent of the 
time t. The cost Ch( I j , d , ? ) of an individual ( d , ? ) with human capital I j ( j∈J) taking up 
an occupation h∈J can be shown by Table 6 because we regard the cost function independent and 
separable. In Table 6, we make C (T) =C( L) =0, C( NE) =C( N) +C( E) +C( NE) , C( I NE , 
d , ? ) =CNI( d ) +CEI( ? ) and so forth and so on. In Table 6, when we make C( N) =C( E) =1,
CNI( d ) =2-d , CEI( ? ) =2-? , and d , ? =0, 1, we can get the total cost Ch(  I j , d , ? ) of 
an individual with latent ability ( d , ? ) and obtained human capital I j ( j∈J)  engaged in different 
occupations h∈J. 
We assume the probability of the latent ability distributing in the whole population P{ d =1} =P{ ? =1
} =0.2, and the probability of the microeconomic situation functioning well or badly P{ s t =1} =P{
s t =0} =0.5. We write down in Table 7 the probability p t (  I j , d , ? ) of an individual with latent 
ability ( d , ? ) investing human capital I j  during the time t. 
We discuss a simple form first: assuming the enterprise managed by each individual has the same scale
; r t  and r t
'  do not enter the entrepreneurial profit function directly and x t (N) or x t (L) do not 
enter the workers’ salary profit either, as follows: 
ƒ NE ( ? ,d , K, r t ,s t ) =3·2 t
s 2 δ+Φ -5d ?  
ƒTE ( ? ,K, r t
' ,s t ) = 3·2
ts 2?  
ƒ NL (t)=3+2 t
s 2d  
ƒTL (t)=2 
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Therefore, we can get the respective reward of an individual with the latent ability ( d , ? ) engaged in 
types of occupations when the microeconomic situation goes well (i.e. st =1) or when badly( s t =0) . 
Applying the cost distribution shown in Table 6, we can get the income (net income) R i ( I j ,d , ? ) of 
individuals with latent ability ( d , ? ) and obtain human capital I j ( j∈J)  engaged in different 
occupations h∈J in different economic situations. Furthermore, we can use Table 5 to calculate the 
expected income ER s ( I j , d , ? ) of individuals with latent ability ( d , ? ) and obtain human 
capital I j ( j∈J)  engaged in different occupations in different economic situations s t  and the results 
are recorded from Line 2 to Line 5 in Table 8 and Table 9 respectively. Also applying Table 7, we can 
get the average expected income EI [ER s ( I j ,d , ? ) ] of individuals with latent ability ( d , ? )
investing human capital I j  under the probability p t ( I j ,d , ? ) and the results are recorded in Line 6 
of Table 8 and Table 9 respectively. When individuals with latent ability ( d , ? ) invest human capital 
I j  under the probability p t ( I j ,d , ? ) , their decision-making depends on the average  expected 
income E s { EI [ER
s (I j ,d , ? )] } anticipated from economic situations because individuals can 
not predict exactly how the economic situation will when investing human capital. Applying the 
supposition P{ s t =1} = P{ s t =0} =0.5, we can get the expected income and record it in the last line 
of Table 9.  
Now, we will discuss the replicator dynamics equation in two cases, which are divided according to 
whether an individual can distinguish his latent ability. First, let us discuss the case in which individuals 
are aware of which type he belongs to. We will discuss it in the following two ways: 
The first way: assuming that individuals have no subjective predictions about the microeconomic 
situation, they make judgements purely under the probability P{ s t =1} = P{ s t =0} =0.5. 
When d =0, ? =0, we can see that it is optimal to invest entrepreneurial human capital when the 
economic situations are sound, while it is optimal not to invest human capital when the economic 
situations are bad. Yet when they try to get expectations to the economic situations, the optimal choice is 
to invest no human capital. We apply replicator dynamics to the analysis: 
From the replicator dynamics equation:  











δ  p t ( I j ,d , ? ) }  
We can get the following replicator dynamics equation groups: 
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There is no other stable state except p11 ( t) , p12 ( t) , p13 ( t) , p14 ( t) among which one corner 
point solution is 1 and the others are 0. From the first formula we know that the right side can never be 
less than 0, so p11 ( t) will not stop increasing until p 11 ( t) =1; whereas in the last there formulae, as 
p11 ( t)  increases, p12 ( t) , p13 ( t) , p 14 ( t) will be decreasing to 0. Therefore we get to know that 
p 11 ( t) =1, p 12 ( t) =p 13 ( t) =p 14 ( t) =0 is a stable state, while other states are unstable. For 
example, in the case that all individuals with latent ability ( 0, 0) invest entrepreneurial human capital 
i.e. when p11 ( t) = p13 ( t) =p14 ( t) , p12 ( t) =1 as long as only a few individuals do not invest 
human capital by changing their initial strategies i.e. p11 ( t) >0, the proportion of such individuals 
will not stop increasing until no individuals of this type will invest any kind of human capital. 
When d =0, ? =1, it is always optimal for each individual to invest entrepreneurial human capital. It 
is similar with the previous case because it also has four corner equilibrium, but only p 22 ( t) =1, p21
( t) =p 23=p 24 ( t) =0 are stable.  
We can make the same discussion when d =1, ? =0 and d =1, ? =1. They all only have corner 
equilibrium, so it is optimal and evolutionarily stable equilibrium for individuals with some kind of latent 
ability to invest human capital of this type.  
The second way: we take it to consideration that the microeconomic functioning is not completely 
random but dependent on inertia. Supposing the initial probability of the microeconomic situation as P{
s 0=1} = P{ s0=0} =0.5, the probability that the microeconomic situation continues functioning 
in this period as well as in the last period as P{ s t =1| s 1−t =1} =0.8, the probability that the bad 
economic situation of last period turns good this period as P{ s t =1| s 1−t =0} =0.2, then from the 
point of the whole history, EP{ s t =1} =EP{ s t =0} =0.5 will be tenable in any period of time t. 
Since individuals’ human capital investment strategies occur in a peculiar period, the economic situation 
of last period will determine the present choice of strategies. We suppose that each individual is near-
sighted when making a decision and depends on the above probabilities of condition to make estimation 
i.e. each individual calculates the expected value of kinds of investment strategies under the probability 
of the microeconomic situation of last period and then makes a comparison with the average expected 
value: if the result of some strategy is better than the average expected value, individuals who choose the 
strategy will be increasing to reach the evolutionarily stable equilibrium at last , which makes individuals 
with each type of latent ability have the stable equilibrium human capital investment strategy dependent 
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on the economic situation. Let us examine the equilibrium strategies of individuals with latent abilityd , 
? . There are two cases:  
When the economic situation of last period goes well, the expected reward of types of strategies of 
individuals of some type is:  
E s [ER
s (I j ,d , ? )]=P{ s t =1| s 1−t =1} ER
1 (I j ,d , ? )+P{ s t =0| s 1−t =1} ER
0 (I j ,d , ? )                 
j∈J 
When the economic situation of last period goes badly, the expected reward of types of strategies of 
individuals of some type is: 
E s [ER
s (I j ,d , ? )]=P{ s t =1| s 1−t =0} ER
1 (I j ,d , ? )+ P{ s t =0| s 1−t =0} ER
0 (I j ,d , ? )              
j∈J 
Now let’s do a calculation when d =1, ? =1. When the economic situation of last period goes well, the 
expected income of investing kinds of human capital is: 
E s [ER
s (ITL ,1,1)]=2.94     E s [ER
s (ITE ,1,1)]=8.3 
E s [ER
s (I NL ,1,1)]=4.94     E s [ER
s (I NE ,1,1)]=10.42 
When the economic situation goes badly, the expected reward of investing kinds of human capital is: 
E s [ER
s (ITL ,1,1)]=2.46     E s [ER
s (ITE ,1,1)]=4.7 
E s [ER
s (I NL ,1,1)]=3.26     E s [ER
s (I NE ,1,1)]=4.18 
Here, we can find that for individuals with latent ability d =1, ? =1, it is an optimal strategy for each 
individual to invest innovative entrepreneurial human capital when the previous economic situation 
functions well; whereas when the previous economic situation functions badly, it is optimal for him to 
invest only imitative entrepreneurial human capital. Therefore, for individuals with latent abilityd =1, 
? =1, the evolutionary stable equilibrium is a kind of investment strategy that depends on the previous 
economic situation: when it functions well, the individuals should invest the innovative entrepreneurial 
human capital; but when it functions badly, we should just invest imitative entrepreneurial human 
capital. Of course, it demands that individuals distinguish the economic situation so that they can make 
correct decisions. We can make similar discussions about individuals with other types of latent ability, so 
let us ignore it here. 
In the above discussions we do think that individuals’ human capital investment strategies do not affect 
the economic situation, but in fact the two may be interrelated to each other. For example, the booming 
economy can make human capital investment become a fashion, which in turn will promote the further 
prosperity of the economy. While the economy is deteriorating, individuals have no confidence in human 
capital investment, which may cause the economy to worsen further. 
In the above two ways, the calculation we consider holds that the expected income of individuals 
investing some type of human capital has nothing to do with other one’s choosing of strategies. It is a 
pure hypothesis to make the calculation easier, which cannot affect the conclusion. 
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Then we suppose individuals cannot distinguish their latent ability, so they must invest human capital 
through the mixed strategy. Supposing during the time t, each individual invests human capital I j  under 
the probability p t ( I j ) , recorded p t ( I TL ) =p 1( t) , p t ( ITE ) =p 2 ( t) , p t ( I NL ) =p 3 ( t
) , p t ( I NE ) =p 4 ( t) , from Table 8 and Table 9, and the supposition P{ d =1} = P{ ? =1}
=0.2 and P{ s t =1} =P{ s t =0} =0.5, we can get the expected income EI [ER
s ( I j ) ] of each 
individual investing human capital I j  and the average expected income E s { EI [ER
s ( I j ) ]} when 
individuals invest the human capital I j  under the probability p t ( I j ) : 
Here we find that it is optimal for individuals to invest entrepreneurial human capital, but it violates the 
routine. The root lies in the hypothesis that the expected income of an individual investing some type of 
human capital has noting to with other individuals’ choosing of strategy. Next, we will make the limiting 
conditions looser. We keep the cost hypothesis unchanged in the previous discussion but change the 
following profit functions:  
ƒ NE ( d , ? ,K, r t ,s t ) =3·2 t
s 2 Φ+δ (1-r t ) 
ƒTE ( ? ,K, r t
' ,s t ) = 2
ts 2Φ 3(1- r t
' ) 
We take the following simple form from the employees’ salary income: 
ƒ NL (t)=4+s t -x t  
ƒTL (t)=2-x t
'  
We notice: x t
' = p1( t) , r t
' = p 2 ( t) , x t = p3 ( t) , r t = p 4 ( t) . Therefore, we can get two 
kinds of reward R s ( h, d , ? ) of individuals with latent ability( d , ? )  engaged in kinds of 
occupations when the microeconomic situation functions well or badly. Similarly, we can work out the 
expected cost EC( h, d , ? ) of individuals with latent ability( d , ? )  engaged in kinds of 
occupations when investing human capital I j  under the probability p t ( I j ) : 




jjhjt hIPICIP ),(),,()( δ  
In order to make the calculation easier, we make p( I j , j) =1, p( I j , h) =0, h? j. Then we can 
get the expected income ER s ( h, d , ? ) of individuals with latent ability( d , ? ) engaged in kinds 
of occupations after investing human capital I j  under the probability p t ( I j ) , the expected income 
E Φ,δ [ ER
s ( h, d , ? ) ] that each individual expects from the occupation, the average expected 
income EI{ E Φ,δ  [ ER
s ( h, d , ? ) ]} that the whole society expects, and the comprehensive 
average expected reward  E s { EI{ E Φ,δ  [ ER
s ( h, d , ? ) ]} } that is expected to the economic 
situation. We record them in Table 11 and Table 12 respectively.  
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From the replicator dynamics equation, we know that the stable state in equilibrium satisfies: 
p 1( t) { 2-p 1( t) -[(2-p1( t) )p 1( t) +(2.6-5.4 p 2 ( t) )p 2 +(1.7- p 3 ( t) ) p3 ( t)
+(-0.12-5.48 p 4 ( t) ) p 4 ( t) ]} =0  
p 2 ( t) { 2.6-5.4 p2 ( t) -[(2-p1( t) )p 1( t) +(2.6-5.4 p 2 ( t) )p 2 +(1.7- p 3 ( t) ) p3
( t) +(-0.12-5.48 p 4 ( t) ) p 4 ( t) ]} =0 
p 3 ( t) { 1.7-p3 ( t) -[(2-p 1( t) )p1( t) +(2.6-5.4 p 2 ( t) )p 2 +(1.7- p 3 ( t) ) p3 ( t
) +(-0.12-5.48 p 4 ( t) ) p 4 ( t) ]} =0 
p 4 ( t) { -0.12-5.48 p 4 ( t) -[(2-p 1( t) )p1( t) +(2.6-5.4 p 2 ( t) )p 2 +(1.7- p 3 ( t)
) p3 ( t) +(-0.12-5.48 p 4 ( t) ) p 4 ( t) ]} =0 
From the last formula, we know p 4 ( t) =0. Then we will work out the non-corner solutions (the 
solutions except 0,1) of p 1( t) ,p 2 ( t) ,p3 ( t) .Simplify the above equation group and get: 
2-p 1( t) =2.6-5.4 p 2 ( t)  
2-p 1( t) =1.7-p3 ( t)  
p 1( t) + p 2 ( t) + p3 ( t) =1 
Hence, we get p 1
* =0.54, p 2
* =0.21,  p 3
* =0.25. That means, under the hypothesis, all 
individuals’ mixed human capital investment strategies are investing in common employees under the 
probability of 0.54, in imitative entrepreneurs under the probability of 0.21, and in innovative employees 
under the probability of 0.25, but there is no individual to invest the corresponding innovative 
entrepreneurial human capital. There are two explanations for this: One may be that the working cost of 
innovative entrepreneurs is too high or the profit rent is too little; the essential reason is that individuals 
can not distinguish their own latent ability, which is extremely disadvantageous to individuals with 
innovative entrepreneurial talent. Although individuals of this type can obtain much high ability rent 
when taking up jobs as innovative entrepreneurs, great losses may be suffered because of lack of the 
relevant ability. The result of evolutionary stability is that no individuals should invest this type of 
human capital. Luckily, it will never occur in reality because each individual knows something about his 
latent ability and there are always such individuals as dare to take risks. 
Now we will work out the separating equilibrium in this case. Ph( t) =0.64p1h( t) +0.16p2h( t
) +0.16p3h( t) +0.04p4h( t) (h=1,2,3,4) indicate the probability of the whole society 
investing the human capital Ih on the condition that the probability of some type of individuals j investing 
human capital Ih and taking up the relevant jobs h is pjh. We record in Table 13 the expected net income 
of each type of individual j toward the economic situation when taking up occupations h and the 
expected net income of this type of individuals investing the human capital Ih under the probability pjh. 
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/4-14
Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Choice to Become Entrepreneur 
 
 25
Therefore, applying the replicator dynamics equation, we can discuss the four cases. First, when d =0, 
? =0, because individuals of this type get the negative net reward when choosing NE, we get p14
* =0; 
second, when d =1, ? =1, applying p 14
* =0, p 4 ( t) is no more than 0.36. Therefore, we can know 
that the optimal strategy is to choose NE for individuals of the typed =1, ? =1, and now we have 
p 44
* =1. Then we get p 41
* =0, p 42
* =0, p 43
* =0. Similarly, because the individual typed =0, ? =0 
can not choose TE, it is optimal for the individual typed =0, ? =1 to choose TE, and we get p 22
* =1,
p 21
* =0, p 23
* =0, p 24
* =0; next, the individual type d =1, ? =0 can not choose LE and TE, so they 
have two kinds of strategy choices NL and NE and then we have p 31
* =0, p 32
* =0; finally, let us see the 
individual typed =0, ? =0. At present, there are still two possible choices TL, NL , and the 
corresponding probability are p11 ( t) ,p13 ( t) . Therefore, we have: 
p 1( t) =0.64 p11 ( t)  
p 2 ( t) =0.16 
p 3 ( t) =0.64 p13 ( t) +0.16 p 33 ( t)  
p 4 ( t) =0.16 p 34 ( t) +0.04 
Because in equilibrium, we have 2-p 1( t) =1.5-p 3 (t), 2.5- p 3 (t)=3-9p 4 (t). Here we can get 
p11
* =0.99,p13
* =0.01, p 33
* =0.81, p 34
* =0.19. 
Up to now we have already work out the separating equilibrium completely. We find that on the occasion 
that each individual type is aware of his latent ability, not only will the individuals with innovative 
entrepreneurial latent ability invest innovative human capital, but also some individuals with innovative 
latent ability will invest innovative entrepreneurial human capital. All of this shows that under our 
hypothesis, both types of talents can obtain the excess of rent reward of his ability and the society system 
can still be incentive for innovative entrepreneurs. 
 
4. Generalization and Conclusions  
 
If the ratio of the output of emerging firms to that of traditional firms does not change, and if the income 
that individuals get by taking up certain occupations has nothing to do with individuals’ latent ability, the 
net income obtained from different occupations is determined solely by the human capital investment 
and the cost of obtaining a job. It is this kind of cost that determines the equilibrium strategy of 
entrepreneurial human capital investment and the equilibrium of choosing occupations. Under such 
circumstances, the state of equilibrium is determined by the distribution of human ability among the 
whole population, the cost of human capital investment involved in transforming latent ability into actual 
ability and institutions such as mainstream culture, political system that affect occupation’s relative 
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payoffs or cost. If the distribution of certain kind of ability among the whole population is improved, 
then the cost of human capital investment will increase and the cost involved in establishing institutional 
environment will also increase. Afterwards, the following result will arise: the rental benefit of this kind 
of ability will decrease, and the proportion of the human capital investment will be reduced, which is a 
loss the society must bear. Given the distribution of certain kind of ability among the population, with the 
cost of human capital investment increasing, it is necessary to reduce the institutional cost in order to 
enable the individuals with latent ability to get their rental benefit. The model shows that 
entrepreneurship is contingent upon social and institutional context and we can predict on the choice to 
become entrepreneur based on the model and some knowledge of the context. 
Assuming that the income that individuals get by taking up certain occupations is related to their latent 
ability, and that the individuals are aware of if they themselves possess entrepreneurial ability, we can 
get the following quantify results: first, it is with high probability that individuals owing entrepreneurial 
ability invest entrepreneurial human capital; second, it is with very low probability that individuals 
owning no entrepreneurial ability invest entrepreneurial human capital; third, the average probability of 
society investing entrepreneur ial human capital is relatively low.  On the contrary, we assume that 
individuals are not aware of if they themselves possess entrepreneurial ability, then the average 
probability of society investing entrepreneurial human capital is relatively high. The average probability 
of investing entrepreneurial human capital in the former case is higher, which is the separate equilibrium 
in game theory. In the latter case, the probability of individuals with latent ability investing human 
capital is a bit too low, which is the pooling equilibrium in game theory. As far as the role of giving full 
play to individuals’ ability, the state of separate equilibrium is inferior to that of pooling equilibrium 
because in the state of separate equilibrium, many individuals with entrepreneurial latent have no 
opportunity to figure out, and many people with no or little ability get more benefit than they deserve. 
The actual situation often lies between the states of separate equilibrium and that of pooling equilibrium, 
i. e. individuals know clearly only some of their ability, so with the whole society considered, the 
probability of investing entrepreneurial human capital also lies between the probabilities in the states of 
separate equilibrium and that of pooling equilibrium. 
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Table1: The cost of individual with latent ability ( d , ? ) and human capital I j ( j∈J) engaged in a 
job h∈J is Ch( I j , d , ? ) : 
 TL                 TE NL NE 
I TL  
0 C( E,? ) +C( ? ,I E )  C( N, d ) +C( d ,I N )  C( E, ? ) + C( N, d ) +C( ? , I NE )  
I TE  
0 C( E,? )  C( N,d ) +C( d ,I N )  C( E,? ) + C( N,d ) + C( d ,I N )  
I NL  
0 C( E,? ) +C( ? ,I E )       C( N,d )  C( E,? ) + C( N,d ) + C( ? ,I E )  
I NE  
0 C( E,? )  C( N,d )  C( E,? ) +C( N,d )  
 
Table2: Dynamics stable  equilibrium of individual human capital investment and job choice 
(E=Equilibrium, HCI=Human capital investment, EF=Equilibrium Feature) 
  d =1, ? =1 d =0, ?  =1 d  =1, ? =0 d =0, ? =0 
HCI I NE  I TE  I NL  I TL  E 
 
1 
EF u * NE 〉 u
*
TE ,  
u * NL , u
*
TL  
u * TE 〉 u
*
NE ,   
u * NL , u
*
TL  
u * NL 〉 u
*
NE  
, u * TE , u
*
TL  
u * TL 〉 u
*
TE , 
u * NL ,  u
*
NE  
HCI I NE  I TE  I NL , I TL  I TL  E 
 
2 
EF u * NE 〉  u
*
TE ,  
u * NL , u
*
TL  
u * TE 〉  u
*
NE ,   
u * NL , u
*
TL  
u * NL = u
*
TL  
〉  u * NE , u
*
TE  
u * TL 〉  u
*
TE , 
u * NL , u
*
NE  
HCI I NE  I TE , I TL  I NL  I TL  E 
3 EF u * NE 〉 u
*
TE ,  
u * NL , u
*
TL  
u * TE =u
*
TL 〉  
u * NE , u
*
NL  
u * NL 〉 u
*
NE ,
u * TE , u
*
TL  
u * TL 〉 u
*
TE ,
u * NL , u
*
NE  
HCI I NE  I TE , I TL  I NL , I TL  I TL  E 
 
4 
EF u * NE 〉 u
*
TE ,  
u * NL , u
*
TL  
u * TE =u
*
TL 〉  
u * NE , u
*
NL  
u * NL = u
*
TL 〉  
u * NE , u
*
TE   
u * TL 〉 u
*
TE ,
u * NL , u
*
NE  
HCI I NE , I TE  I TE  I NL  I TL  E 
 
5 
EF u * NE =u
*
TE 〉  
u * NL , u
*
TL  
u * TE 〉  u
*
NE ,
u * NL , u
*
TL   
u * NL 〉  u
*
NE  
, u * TE ,  u
*
TL  
u * TL 〉 u
*
TE ,
u * NL , u
*
NE  
E HCI I NE , I TE  I TE  I NL , I TL  I TL  
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EF u * NE =u
*
TE 〉  
u * NL ,  u
*
TL  
u * TE 〉  u
*
NE ,
u * NL , u
*
TL  
u * NL = u
*
TL 〉  
u * NE , u
*
TE  
u * TL 〉 u
*
TE ,
u * NL , u
*
NE  
HCI I NE , I NL  I TE  I NL  I TL  E 
 
7 
EF u * NE = u
*
NL 〉  
u * TE , u
*
TL  
u * TE 〉  u
*
NE ,
u * NL , u
*
TL  
u * NL 〉 u
*
NE , 
u * TE , u
*
TL  
u * TL 〉 u
*
TE ,
u * NL , u
*
NE  
HCI I NE , I NL  I TE , I TL  I NL  I TL  E 
 
8 
EF u * NE = u
*
NL 〉  
u * TE , u
*
TL  
u * TE = u
*
TL 〉  
u * NE , u
*
NL  
u * NL 〉 u
*
NE , 
u * TE , u
*
TL  
u * TL 〉 u
*
TE ,
u * NL , u
*
NE  
HCI I NE ,I TE ,I NL  I TE  I NL  I TL  E 
 
9 
EF u * NE = u
*
TE = 
u * NL 〉 u
*
TL  
u * TE 〉 u
*
NE ,  
u * NL , u
*
TL  
u * NL 〉 u
*
NE , 
u * TE , u
*
TL  
u * TL 〉 u
*
TE ,
u * NL , u
*
NE  
HCI I NE ,I TE ,I NL ,I TL  I TE , I TL  I NL , I TL  I TL  E 
 
10 
EF u * NE = u
*
TE = 
u * NL =u
*
TL  
u * TE = u
*
TL 〉  
u * NE , u
*
NL  
u * NL = u
*
TL 〉  
u * NE , u
*
TE  
u * TL 〉 u
*
TE ,




Table 3: The probability of human capital owners engaged in different occupations 
 TL TE NL NE 
I TL  P11  P12  P13  P14  
I TE  P 21  P 22  P 23  P 24  
I NL  P 31  P 32  P 33  P 34  
I NE  P 41  P 42  P 43  P 44  
 
Table 4: the expected reward E s Rh( I j , d , ? )  of individuals with latent ability ( d , ? ) and 
obtained human capital I j ( j∈J) taking up a job h∈J 
 TL TE NL NE 
(I TL ,d ,? ) w TL (t) E s ƒ TE (? ,K,r t
'
,s t )- 
C(I TE ,d , ? )-C(TE) 
E s w NL (t)-C(NL) 
-C(I NL ,d , ? ) 
E s ƒ NE (d , ? ,K,r t ,s t )- 
C(I NE ,d , ? )-C(NE) 
(I TE ,d ,? ) w TL (t)- 
C(I TE ,d ,? ) 
E s ƒ TE (? ,K,r t
'
,s t )- 
C(I TE ,d , ? )-C(TE) 
E s w NL (t)-C(NL) 
-C(I NE ,d ,? ) 
E s ƒ NE (d ,? ,K,r t ,s t )- 
C(I NE ,d , ? )-C(NE) 
(I NL ,d ,? ) w TL (t)- E s ƒ TE (? ,K,r t
'
,s t )- E s w NL (t)-C(NL) E s ƒ NE (d ,? ,K,r t ,s t )- 
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C(I NL ,d ,? ) C(I NE ,d ,? )-C(TE) -C(I NL ,d ,? ) C(I NE ,d , ? )-C(NE) 
(I NE ,d ,? ) w TL (t)- 
C(I NE ,d ,? ) 
E s ƒ TE (? ,K,r t
'
,s t )- 
C(I NE ,d , ? )-C(TE) 
E s w NL (t)-C(NL) 
-C(I NE ,d , ? ) 
E s ƒ NE (d ,? ,K,r t ,s t )- 
C(I NE ,d , ? )-C(NE) 
 
Table5: The probability p(I j ,h) of an individual with human capital I j ( j∈J) taking up a job h∈J 
 TL TE NL NE 
ITL  0.8 0.1 0.1 0 
ITE  0.1 0.8 0 0.1 
I NL  0.1 0 0.8 0.1 
I NE  0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
 
Table6: The total cost Ch(  I j , d , ? ) of an individual ( d , ? ) with human capital I j ( j∈J)
taking up a job h∈J 
 TL TE NL NE 
(ITL ,d , ? ) 0 C(E)+ CEI (? ) C(N)+ CNI (d ) C(NE)+CEI (? )+ CNI (d ) 
(ITE ,d , ? ) CEI (? ) C(E)+ CEI (? ) C(N)+ CEI (? ) 
+ CNI ( d ) 
C(NE)+CEI (? )+ CNI (d ) 
(I NL ,d , ? ) CNI (d ) C(E)+ CEI (? )+ CNI 
(d ) 
C(N)+ CNI ( d ) C(NE)+CEI (? )+ CNI (d ) 
(I NE ,d , ? ) CEI (? )+ 
CNI (d ) 
C(E)+ CEI (? )+ CNI 
(d ) 
C(N)+ CEI (? ) 
+ CNI ( d ) 
C(NE)+CEI (? )+ CNI (d ) 
 
Table 7: the probability p t (  I j , d , ? ) of an individual with latent ability( d , ? ) investing 
human capital I j  during the time t: 
  ITL  ITE  I NL  I NE  
d =0,? =0,  P11 (t) P12 (t) P13 (t) P14 (t) 
d =0,? =1 P 21 (t) P 22 (t) P 23 (t) P 24 (t) 
d =1,? =0 P 31(t) P 32 (t) P 33 (t) P 34 (t) 
d =1,? =1 P 41 (t) P 42 (t) P 43 (t) P 44 (t) 
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Table8: When s t =1, the average expected reward EI [ER
s ( I j , d , ? ) ] of individuals with latent 
ability ( d , ? ) investing human capital I j  under the probability p t ( I j , d , ? ) : 
 d =0,? =0 d =0,? =1 d =1,? =0 d =1,? =1 
ER 1(ITL ,d , ? ) 2.1 2.8 2.4 3.1 
ER 1(ITE ,d , ? ) 2.3 8.7 3.0 9.5 
ER 1(I NL ,d ,? ) 1.5 2.2 4.7 5.5 
ER 1(I NE ,d ,? ) -0.7 5.7 5.3 12.5 
EI [ER 1( I j , 





22 (t)+2.2p 23 (t
)+5.7p 24 (t) 
2.4p 31(t)+3.0
p 32 (t)+4.7p 33
(t)+5.3p34 (t) 
3.1p 41 (t)+9.5p
42 (t)+5.5p 43 (t
)+12.5p 44 (t) 
 
Table9: When s t =0, the average expected reward EI [ER
s ( I j , d , ? ) ] of individuals with latent 
ability( d , ? ) investing human capital I j  under the probability p t ( I j , d , ? ) : 
   d =0,? =0   d =0,? =1   d =1,? =0   d =1,? =1 
ER
0
(I TL ,d ,? ) 
1.7 2.1 1.9 2.3 
ER
0
(I TE ,d ,? ) 
-0.4 3.3 0 3.5 
ER
0
(I NL ,d ,? ) 
0.4 0.8 2.5 2.7 
ER
0
(I NE ,d ,? ) 
-3.5 0.2 0 2.1 
EI [ER
0
(I j ,d ,? )] 1.7p11 (t)-0.4p12  
(t)+0.4p13 (t)-
3.5p14 (t) 
2.1p 21 (t)+3.3p 22
(t)+0.8p 23 (t)+0.2
p 24 (t) 
1.9p 31(t)+2.5p 33
(t) 
2.3p 41 (t)+3.5p 42
(t)+2.7p 43 (t)+2.1
p 44 (t) 
E s { EI [ER
s
 





22 (t)+2.2p 23 (t)+
2.95p 24 (t) 
2.15p 31(t)+1.5p
32 (t)+3.6p 33 (t)+
2.65p 34 (t) 
2.7p 41 (t)+6.5p 42
(t)+4.1p 43 (t)+7.3
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Table 10: the expected reward of individuals investing types of human capital and the average expected 
reward of investing human capital I j  under the probability p t ( I j ) : 
 ER s (I TL ) ER
s (I TE ) ER
s (I NL ) ER
s (I NE ) EI [ER
s ( I j ) ] 
s t =1 2.3 3.724 2.284 1.812 2.3p 1( t) +3.724p 2 ( t)
+2.284p 3 ( t) +1.812p 4 ( t)  
s t =0 1.82 0.412 0.892 -2.214 1.82p 1( t) +0.412p 2 ( t)
+0.892p 3 ( t) -2.214p 4 ( t)  
E s [ER
s ( I j
) ] 
2.06 2.068 1.588 -0.201 ---- 
E s { EI [ER
s
( I j ) ]}  
2.06p 1( t) +2.068p 2 ( t) +1.588p 3 ( t) -0.201p 4 ( t)  
 
Table 11: when s t =1, the expected net reward and kinds of average expected reward of individuals with 
latent ability ( d , ? ) engaged in types of occupations: 
      TL TE      NL    NE 
d =0,? =0 2-p 1( t)  3-6 p 2 ( t)  2- p 3 ( t)  -1-6 p 4 ( t)  
d =0,? =1 2-p 1( t)  10-12 p 2 ( t
)  
2- p 3 ( t)  6-12 p 4 ( t)  
d =1,? =0 2-p 1( t)  3-6 p 2 ( t)  3- p 3 ( t)  6-12 p 4 ( t)  
d =1,? =1 2-p 1( t)  10-12 p 2 ( t
)  
3- p 3 ( t)  19-24 p 4 ( t)  
E Φ,δ [ ER
s (
h,d ,? ) ] 
2-p 1( t)  4.4-7.2 p 2 (
t)  
2.2- p3 ( t)  2.04-7.64 p 4 (
t)  
EI{ E Φ,δ [ ER
s (
h,d ,? ) ]}  
(2-p 1( t) ) p1( t) +(4.4-7.2p 2 ( t) ) p 2 ( t) +(2.2-p 3 ( t
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Table 12: when s t =0, the expected net reward and kinds of average expected reward of individuals with 
latent ability ( d , ? ) engaged in types of occupations:  
        TL TE      NL       NE 
d =0,? =0 2-p 1( t)  -3 p 2 ( t)  1- p 3 ( t)  -4-3 p 4 ( t)  
d =1,? =1 2-p 1( t)  4-6 p 2 ( t)  1- p 3 ( t)  -6 p 4 ( t)  
d =1,? =0 2-p 1( t)  -3 p 2 ( t)  2- p 3 ( t)  -6 p 4 ( t)  
d =1,? =1 2-p 1( t)  4-6 p 2 ( t)  2- p 3 ( t)  7-12 p 4 ( t)  
E Φ,δ  [ ER
s ( h, 
d ,? ) ] 
2-p 1( t)  2.6-5.4 p 2 ( t)  1.7- p3 ( t)  -0.12-5.48 p 4 ( t)  
EI{ E Φ,δ [ER
s ( h, 
d , ? ) ]}  
(2-p 1( t) ) p1( t) +(0.8-3.6p 2 ( t) ) p 2 ( t) +(1.2-p 3 ( t) ) p 3
( t) +(-2.28-4.32p 4 ( t) ) p 4 ( t)  
E s { EI{ E Φ,δ [ER
s
( h,d ,? ) ]} }  
(2-p 1( t) ) p1( t) +(2.6-5.4p 2 ( t) ) p 2 ( t) +(1.7-p 3 ( t) ) p 3
( t) +(-0.12-5.48p 4 ( t) ) p 4 ( t)  
 
Table 13: the expected net reward of individuals with latent ability( d , ? ) engaged in kinds of 
occupations and the expected reward of taking up jobs h when investing human capital Ih under the 
probability pjh : 
 d =0 ,? =0 d =0, ? =1 d =1, ? =0 d =1, ? =1 
TL 2-p 1( t)  2-p 1( t)  2-p 1( t)  2-p 1( t)  
TE 1.5-4.5p 2 ( t)  7-9p 2 ( t)  1.5-4.5p 2 ( t)  7-9p 2 ( t)  
NL 1.5-p 3 ( t)  1.5-p 3 ( t)  2.5-p 3 ( t)  2.5-p 3 ( t)  




? ) ] 
(2-p 1( t) ) p 11 ( t)
+(1.5-4.5 p 2 ( t) ) 
p 12 ( t) +(1.5-p 3 ( t
) ) p 13 ( t) +(-2.5-
4.5p 4 ( t) ) p 14 ( t
)  
(2-p 1( t) ) p 21 ( t
) +(7-9p 2 ( t) ) 
p 22 ( t) +(1.5-p 3
( t) ) p 23 ( t)
+(3-9p 4 ( t) ) p 24
( t)  
(2-p 1( t) ) p 31( t)
+(1.5-4.5p 2 ( t) ) 
p 32 ( t) +(2.5-p 3 ( t
) ) p 33 ( t) +(3-9p 4
( t) ) p 34 ( t)  
(2-p 1( t) ) p 41 ( t)
+(7-9p 2 ( t) ) p 42 ( t
) +(2.5-p 3 ( t) ) p 43
( t) +(13-18p 4 ( t)
)p 44 ( t)  
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